In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is (...) a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices. (shrink)

McDowell's Mind and World offers an epistemological proposal that can be considered as minimally empiricist. His proposal is a notion of experience--appearings--that has a conceptualized character and can serve as a justification for our beliefs. I will argue that even though McDowell's appearings partially solve some of the problems raised against the myth of the Given, they cannot offer a justification for our beliefs. This is so because although appearings do not fall into the dualism of scheme and content, they (...) are the product of another dogmatic distinction that McDowell maintains: the distinction between active and passive kinds of thought./// En Mind and World, McDowell ofrece una nueva propuesta epistemologica que puede ser considerada minimamente empirista. Su propuesta es una noción de experiencia--apariencias--que tiene un carácter conceptualizado y que puede servir asi de justificación para nuestras creencias. Argumentaró que aunque las apariencias de McDowell resuelven parcialmente el problema planteado contra el empirismo en el mito de lo Dado, no pueden ofrecer justificación alguna para nuestras creencias. Esto es así porque aunque las apariencias no caen en el dualismo de esquema y contenido, son producto de otra distincion dogmótica que McDowell mantiene: la distinción entre pensamiento activo y pasivo. (shrink)